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Abstract
Information security is an issue that has increased greatly in importance to both
industry executives as well as military leadership over the past decade. In this time both
practitioner and academic circles have researched and developed practices and process to
more effectively handle information security. Even with growth in these areas there has
been almost no research conducted into how decision makers actually behave. This is
problematic because information security decision makers in the Department of Defense
have been observed exhibiting risk seeking behavior when making information security
decisions that seemingly violate accepted norms. There are presently no models in the
literature that provide sufficient insight into this phenomenon.
This study used Prospect Theory, developed by Kahneman and Tversky, as a
framework to develop a survey in an effort to obtain insight into how decision makers
actually behave while making information security decisions. The survey was distributed
to Majors in the Air Force who represented a sample of likely future information security
decision makers. The results of the study were mixed, showing that prospect theory had
only limited explanatory power in this context. The most significant finding showed that
negatively connotated decision frames result in significantly more risk seeking behavior.
These results provide some insight into potential decision maker behavior and more
importantly highlight the fact that there are biases in information security decision
making. As such, more research is necessary to investigate this phenomenon before
future prescriptive approach development.
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USING PROSPECT THEORY TO INVESTIGATE DECISION-MAKING BIAS
WITHIN AN INFORMATION SECURITY CONTEXT

I. Introduction
General Background
A recent US Secret Service Survey revealed that 68 percent of companies had
knowingly been victims of a cyber attack in 2004. On average each company had to deal
with 86 attacks over the course of the year and in total all attacks accounted for losses of
a staggering $150 million dollars (E-Crime Survey, 2005). Perhaps partially in response
to this hostile environment information security has dramatically jumped in importance
over the last decade. A recent survey of business executives revealed that information
security was now the third most important information technology issue compared to
1994 when security was not among even the top 25 concerns (Luftman, 2005).
As most organizations have realized that information security is a problem that
must be dealt with, they have set about to determine how to better secure their
information systems. There are two fundamental tools advanced for this end, technology
and process. As highlighted by the surveyed executives, security technologies have
become the number one area for internal development in organizations over all other
information technology pieces (Luftman, 2005). Many believe that in order to balance
the competing demands of system functionality and security the organization must
develop a risk management strategy and implement a process to ensure there is adequate
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oversight throughout the organization (Purser, 2004; Tipton and Krause, 2004; Coles and
Moulton, 2003). Business executives must then set about leveraging both the promise of
new technologies and the details of process against an ever changing security
environment.
A quick search of the internet reveals there is no lack of information available on
technologies in practice that purport to help an organization improve their information
security. Similarly one can easily find any number of books or articles in academia that
offer perspective processes for dealing with information security and its associated risks
(Karyda, et al. 2005; Karabacak and Sogukpinar, 2005; McAdams, 2004; Cavusoglu et.
al, 2004; Posthumus and von Solms, 2004; Stewart, 2004; Koskosas and Paul, 2003;
Ranier, 1991) Some of the prescribed risk management or security processes in the
information technology area involve specific actors that have various roles in information
security management decision making and operations. In general, the organization
typically includes a security officer whose job is specifically focused on security
operations who reports to and works with a security manager, often someone with other
executive roles in the organization (Cazemier et. al, 1999; Purser, 2004; Tipton and
Krause, 2004).
Department of Defense Related Background
The Department of Defense is no different than industry in regard to its
development of literature on information security. This is evidenced through the a new
Global Strike integrating document which states, “An integral part of Global Strike
preparation and posturing, IO (information operations) must include measures to protect
friendly plans and networks and deny the adversary knowledge of pending operations.”

2

(GS JIC, 2005). The desire to protect defense networks and the information systems that
are also part of them led to the creation of a program called the DOD Information
Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process or DITSCAP. The goal of
this process is a more deliberate review of new and current information systems such that
all aspects of security are considered against the operational needs for the system.
(ASD(C3I), 1997).

As in the case of commercial security processes, this is a

prescriptive process offering a “how to” for managing security in a complex
environment.
The roles in these prescribed processes can be broken down into basic functions.
As mentioned above, the literature often highlights two individuals as key to the security
process. This is not different in the DOD and the DITSCAP process as there are two
individuals who are vitally important in making a decision to accept the risk on an
information system and subsequently field it. First is the Certification Authority who is
the official
“responsible for performing the comprehensive evaluation of the technical and
non-technical security features of an IT system and other safeguards, made in
support of the accreditation process, to establish the extent that a particular design
and implementation meet a set of specified security requirements.” (ASD(C3I),
1997).

Second is the Designated Approving Authority who is the executive level official, “with
the authority to formally assume the responsibility for operating a system or network at
an acceptable level of risk.” (ASD(C3I), 1997). The work of the CA and the decision of
the DAA will ultimately decide whether a new system is brought on line or an old system
continues operations.
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In order to carry out the entire process, the DAA will task the CA to complete the
myriad tasks throughout the DITSCAP process. The CA carries out a straightforward
deterministic process called certification, which entails a comprehensive procedure of
walking through checklists, vulnerability scans, and other pre-determined items that
validate relative strength or weakness in many different technical and non-technical
security areas. After the process is complete, the CA aggregates all the various data and
looks at the residual risk to then offer a comprehensive risk acceptance recommendation
to the DAA about whether the system should be certified, or approved for full operation.
The CA can also recommend certification with supplemental recommendations, or the
CA can not issue a system certification based on the perceived security risk it would
pose. (ASD(C3I), 1997)
Problem Statement
Not only is it possible for the DAA to completely overrule the CA’s certification
recommendation because of their residual risk assessment, anecdotal evidence in the field
indicates that this is quite frequently done. In practice there is a gap between the residual
risk perception of the CA and the residual risk perception of the DAA in making their
final accreditation decision. It may be expected and even desirable for there to be some
gap as the DAA has more executive level information and thus a different perspective
than the security centric CA. However, the question when looking at this process is what
drives the gap between CA and DAA residual risk assessment? Fundamentally this
question implies another: How does the DAA actually make information security
decisions? DAAs who were told they had an insecure system still determined that they
should operate the system for various reasons and thus the residual risk was acceptable,
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when to the CA the risk was so bad that the system should not be operated under any
circumstances. Recently there has been little attention paid to this phenomenon or
executive decision making in regards to information technology risk assessment and
acceptance that would help us understand why DAAs or other executives may engage in
this kind of behavior.
While there is ample research on decision making in scholarly literature there
appears to be no one model espoused at this point as a possible descriptor for how
decision making happens within an information security context. While countless traits
and individual factors likely contribute to the final decision, there are several basic
decision making theories that provide a parsimonious view of how decisions are made.
One such theory will be explored in greater detail as a possible means to provide a
foundation to build upon when researching executive decision making. Prospect theory
as developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1979, 1981, 1982, 1992) offers one viewpoint
on how decision makers may behave when presented with a risky situation as often faced
in the information security realm. This theory will be expounded on in greater detail
later.
For an organization like the Department of Defense a wide disparity in security
decision making can lead to inconsistent approval of systems and ultimately a more
insecure environment. Today there is no guiding paradigm that offers insight into the
specific nature of decision making in an information security risk assessment context that
would help increase security decision making consistency. In order to better understand
DAA decision making in regards to this residual risk assessment, a model must be
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developed that will allow for exploration of key factors that could influence the decision
process.
Research Questions
This research is the first step in an effort to better understand the gap between
CAs and DAAs in the DITSCAP process. In order to answer how decision makers
decide in an information security context this research will investigate one specific angle.
The purpose of this research is to develop a means to answer the following question:
Are there biases in decision making that influence a decision maker in an information
security context? An expansion of prospect theory in the coming chapter will develop
more detailed research questions and propose several hypotheses as well.
This research will require an extensive literature review of such topics as decision
making, risk theory, organizational behavior, and information security. In order to test
the basic premises of prospect theory in a controlled setting a survey is then developed.
The instrument allows for characterization of each key component of prospect theory to
help determine if indeed this decision making model is applicable to information
technology as well. The instrument will be developed using accepted methodologies to
provide reliability and deal with all threats to validity and other problems typically
associated with IS survey instruments. Future executions of the survey can provide a
means to further explore the decision making process directly with the DAAs.
Implications
The implications of gaining insight into DAA risk assessment decision making
behavior will allow the Department of Defense to understand the value of the DAA as
well as the entire DITSCAP process. Since DITSCAP is a prescriptive process it only
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offers an idealized notion of how information security decisions should be made. This
research focuses on how information security decisions are actually made in practice.
This will help reveal if there is a fundamental difference in how people actually make
decisions and how the DOD would like the process to happen. Validating the principles
of one decision making model will provide a foundation from which other needed
research can be accomplished. The results could also provide a baseline for developing
IA decision making metrics or measurements that provide quantifiable measures of the
consistency of decision making and allow for comparison to expected norms in behavior.
Scope of Research
This study is limited to investigation of decision making through the presentation
of a scenario with two choices. It does not attempt to address or collect different
demographic information, dispositional characteristics, or other potential research items.
As such it is scoped to gain insight into potential bias in information security related
decision making under risk rather than to compile a detailed list of factors or develop an
all encompassing model of behavior. Further this study will be limited to a sample of
Majors drawn from the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) primarily due to time
constraints faced by the researcher.
Limitations
A key limitation of this study will be that it uses a survey instrument to ask a
group of personnel to imagine themselves in hypothetical situations. As such we are
merely measuring behavioral intentions rather than actual behavior. This can provide
more inconsistent and less generalizeable results. Another limitation of this study will be
its focus only on the Department of Defense. The DOD is a unique organization that may
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behave differently than many in industry, thus the generalizability of the model, survey,
and subsequent results may be weak. As such this research will only be able to be used
as a foundation for future work and may not provide a fully vetted information security
decision making model in and of itself.
Summary
This chapter provided a brief background on information security and how
organizations are attempting to assess the risk posed by their information systems.
Specifically an overview of the DITSCAP process was offered and the importance of the
actions of the CA and DAA were explained. This lead to addressing the current problem
of the differences in CA and DAA residual risk assessment decision making and the lack
of any model to further understand the phenomenon how decisions are actually made in
this area. The methodology that this research will use to explore this problem area was
addressed. Further the implications of the research for the DoD and the IT community at
large were discussed.
The remainder of this research will be structured as follows. Chapter two will
provide an in depth literature review of many related disciplines. The review will focus
on many academic reference disciplines through peer review journals, books, and
government publications. Through this review and analysis this chapter will also present
the hypotheses developed for research to help answer the questions proposed. Chapter
three will discuss the methodology used to develop and execute the survey. Chapter four
will present the survey results. Finally chapter five will discuss analysis in detail and the
conclusions reached after executing the survey and will discuss a comprehensive way
ahead for this research stream and offer other opportunities for related research.
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II. Literature Review
Overview
The literature review conducted for this research focused on identifying any
research that might be related to or relevant for information security decision making.
Since the issue at hand is the DAA’s residual risk assessment, careful attention was
applied in searching for any specific studies or references to decision making under risk.
Biases and influences on risky information security decision making are likely quite
varied and not covered completely by any one reference discipline. As a result, sources
were drawn from a wide variety of disciplines including information security,
information technology, managerial decision making, organizational behavior, and risk
theory.
The primary goal of the literature review was to identify an existing line of
research or model that would help explain the observed behavior of DAAs while
providing a basis for research into current information security decision making scenarios
under risk. The model used for investigation should allow for a parsimonious view of
how decisions are made independent of dispositional and organizational factors. If there
are inherent decision-making biases in the information security context they can be easily
exposed at this level. Further, the model must account for decision making under risk.
As defined by Rowe, risk is “the potential for realization of unwanted, negative
consequences of an event” (Rowe, 1977). In the DITSCAP process the DAA is directly
trying to control and mitigate this potential to the greatest extent possible. In the
documentation this is stated explicitly, “The DAA should determine the acceptable level
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of risk to protect the system commensurate with its value to the Department of Defense”
(ASD(C3I), 1997). Therefore, the author used parsimoniousness and risk coverage to sift
through the numerous existing decision making frameworks.
Information Technology Security Management

Since the behavior leading to this research effort was witnessed in the information
security context it is logical to start with this area in the literature review. Within it there
are many frameworks and methodologies espoused for managing information security
and enhancing decision making. This section will draw from the major theories and
works in an effort to determine their applicability for use in this research from a vast
amount of available material.
There are several authors that develop quantitative methodologies for evaluating
different areas of information security. One of the most commonly referenced works in
this area is Ranier who examines prevailing risk analysis methodologies. He states that,
“Because 100 percent IT security is impossible, managers must evaluate the choice of
security measures. In general any security measure or combination of such measures
must not cost more than it would cost to tolerate the problem addressed by the measures
(Ranier et. al, 1991).” This could lead to a hypothesis that a decision maker’s perception
is that the actual loss of operational capability due to fielding an IT security measure is
much greater in cost than the potential loss due to an IT security issue for an unpatched
system.
Ranier states that most measures of IT risk are highly subjective which often
makes management skeptical of risk analysis, leading to non-use of the risk analysis for
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decision making. As such, he focuses his effort on understanding available literature by
reviewing four quantitative (Annualized Loss Expectancy, Courtney, Liverore Risk
Analysis Methodology and Stochastic Dominance) and three qualitative (Scenario
Analysis, Fuzzy Metrics, and Questionnaires) risk analysis methodologies. He then
develops his own hybrid eight step process that is prescriptive in nature (Ranier, 1991).
Similar processes for dealing with risk are also outlined in the Facilitated Risk
Analysis Process (Peltier, 2004) and the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and
Vulnerability Evaluation or OCTAVE developed by Carnegie Mellon University (Alberts
et. al, 2003). The National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST, has also
developed their Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems. Like the
others it outlines a comprehensive set of steps and offers other considerations for
developing a sound approach to managing risk and information security (Stoneburner et.
al, 2002).
Unfortunately, none of these models deal with any factors that may actually
influence the final decision. These models are more valuable in helping a decision maker
arrive at point to make their final decision, but it is not very useful in helping to explain
how decision makers or DAAs actually then decide what to do. In essence it appears to
be geared more towards helping the practitioner community versus enhancing the
academic communities understanding of information security decision making. This
same can be said about many other works in the security realm that offer specific
prescriptive approaches to information security (Tipton and Krause, 2004; Purser, 2004)
The quantitative prescriptive approach that seems to be more practitioner focused
is explored in various ways by many others as well. Cavusoglu offers a quantitative
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model that is specifically developed for the purposes of helping decision makers evaluate
IT security investments (Cavusoglu et. al, 2004). McAdams advocates for the
establishment of a CSO and offers a prescriptive quantitative approach for how
organizations can deal with information security management, however this effort again
includes no discussion of actual decision making (McAdams, 2004). The Information
Security Risk Analysis Method is an attempt to maintain an objective quantified piece of
analysis coupled with management and staff participation in the process. This process is
essentially a survey to key people in the company attempting to accurately judge security
risk to the organization. (Karabacak and Sogukpinar, 2005). In the end however this
technique only provides a quantitative measure of relative risk and still does not deal
effectively with other issues in the risk analysis process or risk based decision making.
Beyond simply offering a quantitative methodology several authors have laid out
frameworks that try to help managers function in the information security domain.
Posthumus and Von Solms offer a framework for the governance of information security.
It is prescriptive and has good background considerations for IT security at large.
However it does not deal with how decision makers will handle IT security issues
(Posthumus and Von Solms, 2004). Coles and Moulton showed that many organizations
had gaps in their risk assessment coverage. One key technique is looking at the business
processes above technical threats and vulnerabilities. They offer the Business Process
Information Risk Management approach which is another attempt to prescribe an
approach based on perceived shortcomings with no content on actual decision making
(Coles and Moulton, 2003).
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Bandyopadhyay et. al, work to offer a framework for managing IT risk that
synthesizes current risk management literature into a four step model of risk
identification, risk analysis, risk reducing measures, and risk monitoring. This research
extends the model through three levels which move from just the technical application
level and brings in organizational considerations and even inter-organizational impacts
into the model. IT risk is not merely in the domain of technology but rather business
operations. This forces a more holistic view to risk management than has been
prescribed in the past (Bandyopadhyay et. al, 1999).
This research is prescriptive in a very general sense. Some attention is paid to
risk analysis through synthesizing previous research, but no clear answers are offered or
measured as far as factors that influence decision makers. The authors state that, “IS
managers must change their way of thinking about risk.” Further, managers are
encouraged to recognize risk at all three levels, to undergo training in decision theory
approaches to risk management, and actively participate in the estimation of their
organization’s overall IT risk (Bandyopadhyay et. al, 1999). However in the end they do
no offer specifics of how current managers may or may not actually approach
information security decisions under risk.
Some have focused on the policy aspects of information security. Karyda
mentions information, hardware, software, the social system, and procedures as the five
key components of information systems that must be dealt with for security. IS security
management aims to minimize risk that IS face in there operation and includes planning,
implementation, assessment, and audit. This study is drawn from the theory of
contextualism in order to take into account the influence that the context has on security
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management process. Their case study found that organizational structure or a flexible
organization is more beneficial in implementing a security policy. Culture or a coherent
organizational culture was more conducive to fielding a security policy. Active
participation of management and security awareness program were important as well
(Karyda et al, 2004). This is again another study that investigates information security
but does not include substantial material on decision making in this environment.
One attempt to deal with information systems security decision making that
wasn’t quantitative or solely prescriptive in nature used job satisfaction as a reference
discipline and translated it into IS security satisfactoriness or concern. This lead to a
model that three factors would influence security concern, the potential for abuse in an
industry, company specific action taken to minimize abuse, and individual factors such as
computer literacy, role or others. Unfortunately the author was unable to demonstrate
support for this theory at the conclusion of the research effort (Goodhue and Straub,
1991). Additionally, Straub’s effort was focused on end users rather than decision
makers. Straub and Welke tried to move into this arena and provided an approach
grounded in deterrence theory and Straub’s earlier unsupported work. This work offers a
several phase model that assumes a deterministic path leading to a decision point that is
clearly laid out. No time is spent further analyzing how the decision maker might weigh
their information security risks (Straub and Welke, 1998).
Stewart offers the idea that it is difficult to calculate a specific level of risk in
information security since reporting it is voluntary and haphazard at best. Further, the
process is “infinitely reflexive” in an always evolving defense and attack environment.
He states that risk must be realistically presented because there is a tendency for IT
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security personnel to overestimate risk such that the organization spends too much time
trying to remediate risk as well as decreasing productivity because of burdensome
security measures. Risk compensation theory highlights the fact that over reliance on
one security mechanism may actually increase security incidents rather than decrease
them. “Because security professionals live and breathe security, their goal for the level of
acceptable risk does not match the company’s perception of the acceptable level of risk”
(Stewart, 2004). Perhaps then DAA behavior is only a reflection of society in the CA’s
over cautious eyes.
The information security community has begun to transition its thinking to
integrate other theories into their work to help mature the community. Koskosas and
Paul effectively brought in other theory by their use of goal setting theory in the context
of information security. Their case study research provides evidence that trust, culture
and risk communication and their interaction can affect the level of security goal setting
within an IT department inside a larger organization (Koskosas and Paul, 2003). This
research validated the fact that social characteristics are likely important when
considering IT security issues, just as they are in many other cases. Unfortunately for the
purposes of the current effort, this research focused on IT departments behavior rather
than the decisions made by executives when presented information by IT departments.
Some authors have even suggested that traditional risk analysis in its more
narrowly focused quantitative engineering mindset may no longer apply. They advocate
for a more comprehensive holistic approach that takes into account the entire spectrum of
issues that affect the IT world using the domains of science and other issues centered in
areas such as politics, economics, sociology, and others. (Gerber and Von Solms, 2005).
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However, this work only suggests breaking out of a traditional mindset without offering
concrete advice for a way ahead. It is important nonetheless to see this as the beginning
of genuine efforts to mature the body of knowledge as this work is attempting as well.
Like Straub previously, Stanton characterized actual end user behavior and its
impact on security (Stanton et. al., 2005). Other end-user research has focused on the
development and application of the technology acceptance model. Davis’s original
concepts of perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use have been expanded upon in
numerous ways (Davis, 1989; Venkatesh et. al, 2003; Qingxiong and Liping, 2004).
However, all of these efforts focus on how users respond to or perceive technology and
are not necessarily applicable to managerial decision making in an information security
context.
When looking at the information security related literature it is apparent that this
is a difficult subject still somewhat in its infancy. The difficulty in measuring aspects of
security are mentioned by numerous authors (Goodhue and Straub, 1991; Posthumus and
Von Solms, 2004). This idea has been further accentuated by some who state that, “Risk
analysis methods that use intensive quantitative measures are not suitable for today’s
information security risk analysis.” (Karabacak and Sogukpinar, 2005) Several studies
have even mentioned explicitly that more research must be done in the area of risk and
information security (Straub and Welke, 1998; Bandyopadhyay et. al, 1999). As a result
of this immaturity, the literature review must be expanded into other areas in order to
help provide a foundation for how decision makers behave under risk in information
security situations.
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The information security literature above shows two areas of strength in current
research efforts. First there have been very robust efforts in developing a prescriptive
approach for managing information security and how to make decisions in this area. As
the field of information security is relatively new compared to other disciplines this is
certainly an important area that requires much background. Second, current research
efforts have explored end user issues from acceptance of technology to security behavior
at some length. Again the information technology discipline requires this kind of
research to be done as well. However, neither one of these areas offers insight into actual
decision maker behavior in information security situations. Further maturation in this
discipline, especially the development of prescriptive approaches to security will
necessitate investigation of how information security decision makers actually behave.
Without this understanding future prescriptive approaches may not “get it right.”

Decision Making
As there are no well developed descriptive models or frameworks for decision
making in information security literature this effort looks to other established reference
disciplines for insight. When trying to develop a decision-making model there are three
basic approaches to take as outlined by Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky. First is descriptive,
which is concerned with how and why people think and act the way they do. Second is
normative, which is empirical in nature and deals with an idealized super rational
intelligent person who thinks and acts as they should. Third, prescriptive studies such as
subjective expected utility tell us what an individual should do and offer a great deal of
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pragmatic value. (Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky, 1988). This research effort is an attempt to
develop a descriptive model that explains why DAAs have behaved in the way they do.
There are many decision making works that provide basic insights into how
anyone may make decisions that could be used for the development of a descriptive
model. March’s primer on decision making has a great summary of many different
facets of decision making as they may apply to this work. His work covers various
decision making theories including limited or bounded rationality, rule following, and
multiple actor theories for how decisions are made (March, 1994). Rowe and
Boulgarides offer both a four factor model of decision making that includes task
demands, organizational influences, personal needs, and environmental forces (Rowe and
Boulgarides, 1992). Organizational behavior works take a different look at behavior and
study how the system of the organization works and influences its decision making
(March and Simon, 1993; Cyert and March 1992).
Several works develop specific effects on decision making that are related to this
research. A competency trap biases the decision maker against changing the status quo
they have settled into through learning processes and positive feedback loops (March,
1993) This theory has been expanded into something called the hot stove affect which
states that biases against new and risky alternatives may be less properties of individuals,
organizations, or cultures than of competitive selection and reproduction themselves
(Denrell and March, 2001).

Another study showed that there is a tendency for decision

makers to escalate commitment above and beyond what would be warranted by the
objective facts of the situation. External justification will lead decision makers to commit

18

in an effort to prove they were right when facing an external threat or evaluation (Staw,
1981).
Unfortunately, neither individual decision making theories, specific effect
research, nor organization theories can totally account for individual behavior under risk.
Additionally some of the above theories by themselves are very broad and would
jeopardize the parsimoniousness requirement for this study. These works do form the
foundation for works that have narrowed their focus of study to how individuals behave
in risky situations. For this reason the literature review will now focus on research that is
specific to decision making under risk to meet the necessary requirements for the study.
Decision Making Under Risk
Many studies investigate individual facets or influences on decision making
under risk. One study investigating this topic fused the personality trait focused Five
Factor Model of Extraversion, Neuroticism, Hostility, Lack of Conscientiousness and
Openness to Experience with decision making under risk (Lauriola and Levin, 2001).
They found that in decision making to avoid a loss personality factors were not
statistically significant, but when making a risk decision to achieve a gain low
Neuroticism (emotionally stable) and high Openness to Experience were significant
predictors of who would make a decision with a higher amount of risk. Personality
factors aside males took more risks than females and older people took less risk for gains
but more risks to avoid loss (Lauriola and Levin, 2001).
MacCrimmon and Wehrung investigated the relationships between risk taking
propensity and a variety of socio-economic characteristics. Among their many findings
they found that large organization executives may be more risk averse than their

19

counterparts in small organizations. They found that the more successful the individual
the more inclined they were to take risks probably in a view that risk taking translated
into success. Higher individual maturity also led to higher risk aversion and less risk
taking behavior (MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990).
Kahneman and Lovallo offer several unique ideas. They emphasize the idea of
loss aversion. This principle states that losses and disadvantages are weighted more than
gains and advantages such that it favors inaction over action and the status quo over any
alternatives because the disadvantages of these alternatives are evaluated as losses and
are subsequently weighted more than the advantages (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993).
They also offered the idea of the inside view and the outside view. The inside view is
generated by focusing on the case at hand, by considering the plan and the obstacles to its
completion, by constructing scenarios and by extrapolating current trends. The outside
view ignores the details of the case at hand and focuses on the statistics of a class of cases
chosen to be similar in relevant respect to the present one. The inside view is often
wrong but is still preferred in decision making. The inside view is often overly
optimistic: 80% of entrepreneurs rated their chances of success at 70% or better when in
reality it was only 33% (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993).
In a study of risk and decision making on commercial lending, McNamara and
Bromiley discovered that organizational factors substantially influence managers’
assessments of risky decisions. They also found that standardization of the process did
not increase or decrease a manager’s risk assessment. Their research also underscored
support for the “Fads and Fashion” effect. That is the more “excitement” around a
particular industry, the more likely the managers were to underestimate risk. They did
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not find support for the idea that more poorly performing firms tend to take more risks
(McNamara and Bromiley, 1997).
There are numerous other findings and studies of interest when investigating
decision making under risk. Decision makers become more risk averse when they expect
their choices to be reviewed by others (Tetlock and Boettger, 1991). There may be
behavioral biases in risk management including regret bias (sunk cost, house money),
overconfidence, statistical biases (extrapolation, disaster myopia), group think and
herding (Rizzi, 2003). There is a positive correlation between the level of risk taking
behavior and the managers position in organizational hierarchy while there is no
significant correlation between organizational factors and risk taking (Noy and Ellis,
2003). Jia builds on previous efforts and offers a detailed break out of mathematical
modeling of perceived risk (Jia, 1999). Because managers are typically in a higher
position attained through previous success, they tend to have the perception that their risk
taking in previous endeavors has served them well. They tend to think that they can
control what appears to be a process of chance. This tends to make managers somewhat
more prone to take risks than someone else might be. Also there is societal pressure on
managers to behave in this manner as they are expected to make things happen and take
good risks to do so. (March and Shapira, 1987) Further, no matter how significant the
potential affect, outcomes with low probabilities tend to be ignored. (March and Shapira,
1987).
There is some degree of contradiction between different studies as well. Smidts
found that decision makers are intrinsically risk seeking. He found that risk attitude and
strength of preference (two factors in hypothesis of intrinsic risk attitude) are to
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distinctive constructs (Smidts, 1997). This is contrasted by SP/A Theory and Venture
Theory which predict decision makers to be rarely risk seekers (Lopes, 1987; Hogarth
and Einhorn, 1990). This conflict is highlighted by the feeling that there is not a perfect
way to characterize risk behavior and a lack of full understanding of possible interactions
between task characteristic and individual traits. (MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Lauriola and Levin, 2001). As such, any effort in this
study is recognized as not a perfect representation of DAA information security risk
behavior, but rather an initial attempt at explaining behavior.
One item that appears many times in decision making under risk literature is the
idea of the context that the decision is made in. This is often referred to framing the
decision as well (March, 1994; Kahneman and Tversky, 1986). Individual risk
preferences in a given situation are not stable, but rather they are strongly influenced by
normatively irrelevant changes to the context of judgment (Erb et. al, 2002). Biasing
participants with certain types of content before exposure to risk related issues can affect
their level of risk seeking behavior. Further the effects can be strong and most
participants were unaware of the influence of priming unless their attention was
specifically drawn to it (Erb et al., 2002). This theme is reinforced in several earlier
works on context dependent risk taking that stated when outcomes are good humans are
risk averse but when possible outcomes are poor humans tend to be risk seeking
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; March and Shapira, 1987).
Some state risk preference varies with context that being primarily influenced by
the current focus of the decision maker. In regards to risk the most common focus is
success from subjective failure. This line of thinking translates into a risk behavior of
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avoiding risk when in or near a successful state and when in or near an unsuccessful state
there is a tendency to take more risks (March and Shapira, 1987). Tversky and
Simonson highlight the fact that people often do not have a global preference order and
as a result they use the context they are in to identify the most attractive option (Tversky
and Simonson, 1993). This is counter to the traditional theory of value maximization that
assumes that a decision maker will chose the option of highest value when presented with
valued options in a given set of alternatives.
The relative attractiveness of one risky option compared to another often depends
on the presence or absence of a third option. This is called tradeoff contrast which is
broken into background and local contexts. Background context is important because it
leads to a higher likelihood of a certain action. Local Context dictates that the “market
share” of an option can actually be increased by enlarging the offered set. That is, when
presented with a third less appealing option more people would chose the most attractive
option than when just two items were present (Tversky and Simonson, 1993).
Tversky and Simonson also cover the concept of extremeness aversion. That
means that disadvantages loom larger than the corresponding advantages. As a
consequence, options with extreme values within a set of alternatives will be relatively
less attractive than options with intermediate values. Compromise is the idea that when
faced with extreme options on each end people will tend to chose an option somewhere in
the middle of the two presented options. Polarization implies the gravitation from, or
aversion of, one extreme only. There is not extremeness aversion in binary (two choice)
options (Tversky and Simonson, 1993).
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The above studies allow for parsimonious investigation of risk, but do not in
themselves provide a single framework that can be used for investigating the observed
DAA decision making behavior under risk. They could perhaps be combined into a new
framework that would then allow the ability to look at decision making under risk in
information security. However, a key issue that would have to be overcome is
determining exactly which factors are more important to include over others, and with
some disagreement in some areas the task is even more difficult. However, there is
already a model that may explain observed behavior and allow for investigation through
research. Many of the previously mentioned concepts are captured in a model called
Prospect theory that meets both the requirement of parsimoniousness and is a model of
decision making under risk.
Prospect Theory
As mentioned earlier, the model used for investigation should allow for
parsimonious view of how decisions are made independent of dispositional and
organizational factors. If there are inherent decision-making biases in the information
security context they can be easily exposed at this level. Further, the model must account
for decision making under risk. In the DITSCAP process the DAA is directly trying to
control and mitigate this potential to the greatest extent possible. In the documentation
this is stated explicitly, “The DAA should determine the acceptable level of risk to
protect the system commensurate with its value to the Department of Defense”
(ASD(C3I), 1997). Therefore, this study used parsimoniousness and ability of the model
to explain risk based decisions to sift through the numerous existing decision making
frameworks.

24

One theory that clearly meets the above criteria as well as offering potential
insight to observed behavior at face value is Prospect Theory as developed by Kahneman
and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This is a descriptive theory that was
proposed as an alternative to expected utility theory. The deviations it has from expected
utility theory may be particularly useful in exploring the behavior anomalies observed by
this study’s sponsor. The theory is well supported through research and academic
development over the years (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1992). It
has also been applied at least in a limited manner in the information technology context
although not in directly analyzing managerial decision making under risk (Rose et. al.
2004).
Prospect theory as developed offers a model of decision making that can be
conceptualized as in Figure 1. First all possible outcomes are edited and framed by the
decision maker. The function of this phase is to, “organize and reformulate the options
so as to simplify subsequent evaluation and choice” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
After the outcomes are framed and edited, the decision maker evaluates each of the
options or prospects and chooses the one with the highest value (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). The value of each is expressed in terms of a decision weight, π, and outcome
value, V (see figure 2). The decision weight is assigned to a given probability of an
outcome. The outcome value is a subjective measure of how much that particular
outcome is worth to the decision maker (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
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Figure 1 – Prospect Theory Model of Decision Making

The important characteristics of this theory are that value is determined not by
overall position but by deviations from a reference point or status quo. That is all
outcomes are seen as gains or losses in comparison to a current reference. Secondly
gains and losses elicit a certain pattern of decision making behavior under risk such that
decision makers are typically risk averse in a gain domain and risk seeking in a loss
domain. Additionally, the framing of outcomes can affect the reference point used in
evaluation of prospects. The value of prospects also follows an S shaped curve that is
concave for gains and convex for losses, with the losses being steeper than gains (Figure
3). It also allows for diminishing losses. These characteristics taken individually or
together may be able to be leveraged in explaining the problematic behavior observed by
the sponsor of the research.

Figure 2 – Prospect Theory Value Equation
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Prospect theory is not without its detractors or competing theories. Weber and
Milliman executed two experiments with commuting times and stock choices in order to
investigate the if the differences in risky choice behavior could be explained as
differences in risk attitude (preferences and personality based) or risk perception (Weber
and Milliman, 1997). This study contradicted Prospect Theory’s predictions for risk
seeking behavior in a loss domain and risk averse behavior in a gain domain. As a result
it questions the generalizability of prospect theory outside financial domains. Additional
theories such as Security Potential/Aspiration (SP/A) theory, Subjective Expected Utility,
and others are not ready to concede to Prospect Theory as the end all for explaining
behavior under risk (Bell et. al, 1994).

Figure 3 – Prospect Theory Value Function
Besides the previous evidence of success with the theory, the detractors are
outweighed by the evidence that using lottery type scenarios to investigate risk in general
situations have been found to be more effective than just using psychometric
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measurement questions. Penning and Smidts assess the validity of measuring the risk
attitude construct through two prevailing measurement approaches. The first measures
are derived from the expected utility framework of lotteries and the second are through
the use of psychometrics. They found that while psychometric scales were successful in
predicting risk attitude variables they did not, in the end, correctly predict behavior
(Penning and Smidts, 2000). The expected utility items such as lottery and intrinsic risk
measures were effective in predicting actual behavior and had only limited success in
predicting risk attitude variables.
Hypotheses
If Prospect theory is to provide a descriptive model for behavior in information
decision making, its basic characteristics should be evident in a well designed survey.
One way decision makers could be biased is by viewing the security proposition
proposed by their personnel as an operational loss. In order to establish both prospect
theory in information security and determine if operational loss domains are more
poignant, the following hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis 1 –
Decision makers are risk averse in gain domains in the information security context.
Hypothesis 2 -Decision makers are risk seeking in loss domains in the information security context.
Hypothesis 3 –
Decision makers exhibit significantly more risk seeking behavior in operationally framed
loss domains than in security framed loss domains.
Prospect theory could also hold descriptive power in the information security
context if outcome framing or an explicit shift in the reference point are able to affect risk
seeking behavior. The following hypotheses will test these notions:
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Hypothesis 4 –
A negative information security outcome frame will result in greater risk seeking
behavior than a positive information security outcome frame.
Hypothesis 5a –
Shifting the reference point into a loss domain will result in significantly more risk averse
behavior to for losses.
Hypothesis 5b –
Shifting the reference point into a loss domain will result in significantly more risk averse
behavior for gains.
Prospect Theory’s idea of decision weights and outcome value could also help
clarify how DAAs may actually make decisions involving security. Along these lines the
following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 6 –
When presented with situations involving information security and operations, decision
makers will tend to give a greater decision weight to operations outcomes.
The final issue in this study deals with how a person’s career field background
could shape behavior under prospect theory. Since DAAs typically are drawn from line
of business or in the military, operational, backgrounds it may be useful to contrast
results between operational and non-operational Air Force personnel. The hypotheses are
developed from the perspective that the operational personnel will tend to be more risk
seeking thus potentially helping to explain observed DAA behavior. While this may not
necessarily be the case, for the purposes of hypothesis development one side must be
assigned to each sample.
Hypothesis 7a –
Non operational decision makers are significantly more risk averse in information
security related gain domains than operational decision makers.
Hypothesis 7b –
Non operational decision makers are significantly more risk averse in information
security related loss domains than operational decision makers.
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Hypothesis 7c –
Decision makers with an operational background give a greater decision weight to
operations outcomes over security outcomes.
Hypothesis 7d –
After a negative shift in the reference point, decision makers with an operational
background are more risk averse than non-operational decision makers, in a gain domain.
Hypothesis 7e –
After a negative shift in the reference point, decision makers with an operational
background are more risk averse than non-operational decision makers, in a loss domain.

Summary
The literature above demonstrates a relative dearth of prior research into
managerial decision making in an information security context. Prospect theory provides
one model for investigating this under served area. All the proposed hypotheses seek to
use Prospect theory to answer the fundamental question being investigated in this
research: Are there biases in decision making that influence a decision maker in an
information security context? The following chapters present the results of this effort.
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III. Methodology
The Survey Instrument
In order to develop a survey from prospect theory that would investigate
information security decision making it was necessary to obtain examples of previously
conducted studies in prospect theory. The studies of interest were drawn from the
previously validated works of Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Tversky and Kahmenan, 1983). They used the same types
of questions in multiple studies which helped validate that the general types of questions
they asked did indeed measure risk and risk aversion appropriately. Further these
validated studies provided the basis for wording of questions to help ensure that the
appropriate constructs were measured.
The approach used in these studies and carried out in this study was to ask
scenario preference questions and give two possible choices. One choice always
represents a riskless choice offering either a sure loss or sure gain depending on the
question. As developed in prospect theory, preference for this option demonstrates risk
averse behavior. The other choice is a risky option that presents a certain chance of a
greater loss or gain than the sure thing and a certain chance of no gain or loss. As
specified in prospect theory, this option represents risk seeking behavior. What changes
from question to question throughout the studies is either the context the question is
asked in (financial, medical, etc.) or the degree of gain/loss and the percentages involved.
For the purposes of this survey, questions were taken from these works and
modified to reflect and information security context rather than financial or medical
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contexts as highlighted in the reference works. Wording for each question was chosen to
directly mimic the wording of specific questions from previous prospect theory works.
The numbers and percentages in each question were also chosen in magnitudes that were
represented in questions within the original studies. In each case the wording was only
changed enough to change the underlying theme of the question to that of information
security. The background presented before the questions was also changed to reflect
current security and operations of an information system, rather than a current financial
position or as otherwise done in previous prospect theory work. The background also
was presented in a manner that framed the decision as an organizational outcome rather
than a personal one.
The questions developed for testing the hypotheses proposed in this study fell into
several broad categories. In order to test H1, H2, H3, H5, and H7 two sets of questions
were developed. One reflected the overall security posture of the information system
while the other set reflected the overall operational capability of the system. These two
sets of questions were worded exactly the same with the only exception being wording
differences to reflect security posture and operational capability. Each of these types of
questions also was asked with two different degrees of certainty and magnitude of effect
in both a gain and loss frame. This was done in an attempt to strengthen the validity of
the overall investigation by using multiple sets of questions for each frame rather than
just the results from one question of each type. Two types were chosen to offer more
validity while at the same time maintaining a reasonable length for the survey.
Another set of questions was developed to reflect a positive and negative
reference frame for a general information security issue. This was done to test H4 and
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was very similar to previous prospect theory work that had been done in a medical
context (Tversky and Kahnmen, 1986). One question was asked in a positive frame and a
second was asked from a negative frame of reference. Both of these questions had the
same background and offered two responses that had mathematically equivalent answers
and were presented to emphasize either positive aspects of the solution or negative
aspects of the solution.
The final set of questions, which tested H6, measured operations and security
decision weight together. These questions were developed using previous prospect
theory work as a guide, but there were no specific questions that were done previously to
reference. As such, a general set of percentages was chosen that was similar to other
prospect theory questions. Two questions were developed that emphasized implementing
an operational solution at the expense of security and two questions were developed that
emphasized a security solution at the expense of operations. Each question again had two
responses. One response was to implement the given solution, thereby indicating
preference for either operations or security in the given gain or loss circumstance. The
other response was to not implement the solution which meant forgoing the gain in one
area for no loss in the other area thereby indicating preference for either operations or
security as well.
All the questions in the survey were presented immediately after a background
reading included in the survey which sought to develop a positive frame for the overall
security posture and operations capability of the information system. The questions were
also mixed together such that no one type of question repeated and so that questions of all
types were as equally separated as possible. The positive and negative framed questions

33

were intentionally spaced far apart to help mitigate any affect that answering one might
have on the other as they are very similar questions. After the first presentation of
questions, another background information scenario was presented in the survey that
offered a much more negative frame of reference from the security standpoint, while
maintaining the same perspective as previously described for operations. The eight
questions that specifically targeted security and operations decision making risk behavior
were then asked again. This line of questions was developed specifically to target H5 but
also could provide some insight into H1, H2, and H3 as well.
The only piece of personal data that was collected was the individual’s Air Force
Specialty Code (AFSC). While it is entirely possible for people to be new retrainees or
have prior enlisted experience in a given area, these areas were not factored in due to the
primary focus on Prospect Theory and the desire for survey brevity. They could be
included in follow on efforts that may extra more personal factors. This piece of
information was essential to test H7. Personal information collection was limited in order
to maintain brevity in the survey, provide more simplified results for analysis, and to
speed the process of approval for distribution due to time constraints for dispersal. A
copy of the final baseline survey is included in Appendix A.
Randomization
To eliminate potential bias of a particular survey, six separate versions of the
survey were developed. In an effort to prevent bias from being introduced by the
ordering of questions or answers within each survey, a comprehensive randomization
scheme was developed. Questions were initially assigned an order in a master survey.
As previously mentioned, the baseline order ensured that no type of question was asked
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twice in a row or too close together. The baseline attempted to spread all questions as
evenly as possible by type to eliminate an order induced bias. Each baseline ordered
question was then assigned a group. There were five groups of four questions; gain
questions, loss questions, decision weight questions, gain after second scenario, and loss
after second scenario. To randomize these groups, a list of all possible permutations of
four (24 total) was developed and assigned a number from one to 24. Each group was
then assigned a random number between one and 24 that corresponded to the like
numbered permutation of four. This ordering was then used for each set of four.
An additional step of randomization was choosing what set of questions to begin
each version of the survey with, both in the first set of questions and the set of questions
after the second scenario. A one or two was randomly generated in all cases to determine
whether each segment would begin with either an increase or decrease question.
Depending on the results of this, the placement of all increase or decrease questions
would be transposed in each area throughout the survey in order to maintain an ordering
like the baseline survey. The set of two verbiage questions were also randomized using a
random choice of one or two in order to determine which question came first.
After all the questions were randomized and each of the six survey versions was
reordered to reflect the randomizations, the order of responses was randomized as well.
To do this a 24 x 6 matrix was develop in Microsoft Excel 2003™. Each question was
then randomly assigned a zero or one. Zero indicated that the first response would be A,
as specified in the baseline survey, while a one indicated the first response for that
particular question would be B, as specified in the baseline. All responses were changed
according the randomization matrix and relettered as A and B appropriately. This
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provided each randomized survey with a completely randomized order of responses
helping to mitigate any bias that may be interjected by presenting the same type of
answers in the same order for every question. A summary view of all randomizations
completed can be found in Appendix B.
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Pilot Survey
A pilot survey was accomplished for this study. The pilot survey instrument was
not substantively different than the final baseline survey, as such it is not included. The
pilot survey had two primary purposes. The pilot provided a means to test the execution
of survey to gather initial insights into timing and potential response behaviors. The
survey was also used to solicit feedback on the survey instrument itself in an effort to
eliminate poor wording choices, confusion, or other problems that could jeopardize
results. The pilot study was not designed to validate proposed hypotheses, as the sample
was taken from a different population than that intended in the final survey.
The pilot survey was distributed to 16 students at the Air Force Institute of
Technology. The students were from various backgrounds including Medical, Civil
Engineering, and Communications/Information career fields. Students held ranks from
Senior Master Sergeant to Captain. Due to time constraints, members involved were
selected based on direct relationships with author. Thus the sample for the pilot was a
non-random convenience sample. Further, the sample in the pilot was not representative
of the demographic needed for the study. However, all pilot participants have had
graduate level instruction on research methods and have been exposed to various forms
of research. Thus this sample still provided a good method of obtaining feedback on
questions, wording, and other general issues the survey may have had as well as
validating time to completion. The survey was distributed via e-mail to all 16
participants and returned by 10 for a response rate of 62.5 percent. Respondents career
fields were as follows: Communication Information Officer – 3, Bioenvironmental
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Engineer Officer – 1, Civil Engineering Officer – 3, Communication Information
Enlisted – 1, Civil Engineering Enlisted – 1, and Medical Enlisted – 1.
All participants were asked to electronically mark any minor corrections they thought
necessary as well as provide detailed comments at the end to include suggestions for
improvement, major/minor shortcomings, areas of confusion, or any other issues they
may have seen.
Pilot Suggestions
The following are substantive suggestions received after distribution of the pilot
survey. This does not include spelling, grammar, or other basic mechanics corrections
that were identified. Additionally, positive comments or comments affirming
backgrounds, tone, and other areas were not included. Three people did not include any
comments. The average time to complete was adjusted to 20-30 minutes from 30-40
minutes. Each comment is preceded with a (C) and the response to each is identified
with an (R).
(C) I would caveat questions 15-22 by including the fact that you have new information
to base your decision e.g. . “Based on these findings and the new information mentioned
directly before question 15 (or something like that), you have two options available of
which you must choose one:”
(R) Verbiage was updated to more clearly highlight the fact that those questions were
based on the second scenario presented.
(C) Some of the questions didn’t seem to be clear or the choice would never seem
plausible.
(R) This in regards to a the set of questions that said “Increase system security” and
offered an overall decrease in security. Rather than explicitly state increase the security
the wording was change to be neutral as to whether security is actually increased or
decreased by saying “implement a set of new security measures.”
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(C) You should add some comments here, like, “ End of Survey” and “Thank you for
participating in this survey.”
(R) END OF SURVEY and “Thank you for your participation in this research effort.”
Was added to the last page of the survey.
(C) My only suggestion would be to define the difference between security strength and
posture…I am not even sure of the difference in terms of networks!
(R) No instance of the word security strength was found in this survey.
(C) Be consistent with either percentages or fractions in the answers and questions.
(R) Percentages and fractions were used in answers in the best possible combinations,
mimicking previous prospect theory questions. Most respondents agreed with this format
as such it will not be changed.
(C) Use percentages or standardize numerical format. The fractions are not easy to
interpret.
(R) Fractions were extensively used in previous prospect theory research as such they
will be used in this research effort.
The most significant change resulting from the pilot survey was the rewording of
the security posture related questions. Many people were confused by the wording that
offered an option to “increase system security.” After careful reflection and review, it
was apparent that the question scenarios all offered an increase or decrease in a certain
percentage so what really needed to be in the answer was merely verbiage reflecting
“implementing security measures.” This was more applicable to the overall research
effort as well, since implementing security measures in the field often comes with
uncertain results. Thus, a more realistic verbiage is to “implement several new security
measures” and then provide the results of this separately, whether increase or decrease in
the system’s security posture. Wording in this manner eliminated a scenario where the
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question effectively said that increasing the security resulted in the security being
decreased, an obvious logical impossibility.
Final Survey Sample and Procedure
This research effort sought to measure, as closely as possible, actual DAA
behavior intentions. Due to the complexity of obtaining a sufficient sample size of actual
DAAs a sample was used from a similar population. The final survey sample was drawn
from Majors (O-4s) attending the Air Force Institute of Technology to obtain various
Masters of Science degrees under the auspices of officer Intermediate Development
Education (IDE). These Majors are a good sample that can provide generalizability about
actual DAA behavior for several reasons. First, all the Majors were competitively
selected over their peers to attend this particular IDE in residence school program. This
competitive selection often sets the individual on a course that is almost a necessity for
promotion into senior officer ranks of O-6 or higher. DAAs are often O-6s or higher, and
as such this group of Majors then represents a very likely pool of future DAAs.
Additionally, this group of Majors is drawn from a wide diversity of career fields
representing all officer careers in the Air Force.
Once selected for intermediate service school in residence programs the Majors
have 22 possible options for which school they may attend; however, Air Command and
Staff College (ACSC) and the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) present the
largest opportunity (AFPC Website, 2005). Officers can indicate preferences, but Air
Force policy stipulates that the Air Force will decide where the officer ultimately attends.
In the eyes of the Air Force both ACSC and AFIT offer similar end states for the officer
that are indistinguishable from the other. Thus, when an officer is assigned to one of
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these two programs it is done in a relatively random manner, or at least that is what the
Air Force considers the case. As such, for the purposes of this research, the sample in
question will be treated as a probability sample because of the random assignment to this
program from the larger population of potential future DAAs.
This sample was drawn specifically from those Majors participating in a
management focused graduate degree rather than more technical degrees such as physics
or an engineering discipline. Based on Air Force career progression there is an increased
likelihood that those in the managerial degree program will ultimately be in a senior
managerial role in the Air Force, which often has the responsibility of DAA as well.
Those in technical degrees are more likely to progress in the science and engineering area
which is not of interest in this particular research effort. Approaching the sample in this
manner will help strengthen external validity through better generalizability.
The majors chosen for this survey were all participating in a research methods
class at the beginning of their second quarter of graduate education. The survey was
distributed on the first day of class after approximately 90 minutes of lecture. There were
four separate sections totaling 79 participants. The survey was handed out in hard copy
by the researcher with instructions on the front page read to everyone. The six different
versions of the survey were ordered one after another such that there was a nearly equal
distribution of each version. Participation was voluntary however, all were encouraged to
complete the survey to help with the research effort. Two individuals chose to take the
survey home and did not return it. One individual turned in a completely blank survey
for unknown reasons. Seventy six people handed in completed surveys for an overall
response rate of 96.2 percent. After collection, all final answered surveys were coded
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into Microsoft Excel 2003™. After this was complete, all results were rearranged to
reflect the original baseline order of questions and answers for standardized analysis.
Analysis
The analysis of this data was accomplished using Microsoft Excel 2003™,
version 11.6355, with its suite of built in capabilities augmented by a statistical analysis
program called PHStat, version 1.4, that is commonly distributed with statistics textbooks
published by Prentice Hall. Since all results are based on scenarios with two distinctly
opposite results, this research will be a combination of large sample tests of hypotheses
about a population proportion for single samples and large sample tests comparing two
population proportions. Since multiple questions were asked that measured each area,
the appropriate question’s results were aggregated as necessary for all hypotheses to
allow for analysis of the combined data.
The appropriate numbers were developed and used to conduct the necessary
hypothesis tests to answer each question. All A answers were coded as zero and all B
answers were coded as one. In every case the responses were standardized to mean the
same thing. In most cases A specified the risk averse option and B specified the risk
seeking option except in the decision weight questions where security favored outcomes
were coded as zero and operations favored outcomes were coded as one. Statistical tests
of hypothesis were then performed on the aggregated results to see if in the given
scenarios the results were statistically different from a null hypothesis of indifference or
Ho being p = .5. If there were pure indifference in the sample between choices the results
would be expected to show that the resultant proportion was .5. If there was a preference
for one option or the other, the results should be significantly greater or less. In each
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hypothesis test, validity of conditions for a Large-Sample hypothesis test for p are
completed as well by ensuring that the interval po +/- 3σp does not contain 0 or 1. Unless
noted, all tests satisfied this condition. The other condition for statistical analysis is a
random sample, and as mentioned earlier the random assignment of majors to this
program will satisfy this requirement.
Reliability calculations were not performed in the data analysis because of the
non-applicability of accepted reliability measures for the type of questions offered in this
survey. Cronbach’s alpha is used in multivariate settings however, Kuder-Richardson
formula 20 (KR-20) could be used to determine reliability of dichotomous variables.
Unfortunately, due to the structuring of the questions the results from using KR-20 do not
provide meaningful results as the coding of the question responses does not always mean
the same thing.
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IV. Results
This chapter presents the results of analysis of the survey data in regards to how
they answer the research questions proposed earlier. The analysis is presented in tables
that break out the research question and corresponding hypothesis. The baseline survey
questions used for analyzing the particular hypotheses are listed, and then the type of
statistical test used is included along with the actual statistical test. Finally, the results of
the test are presented along with verbiage that explains what the results mean in basic
terms. More complete discussion of results will be included in the next chapter.
Analysis was conducted using statistical techniques outlined in Statistics for Business and
Economics and to a lesser extent Research Methods for Organizational Studies
(McClave, Benson and Sincich, 2005; Schwab 2005).
Operational and Non-Operational AFSCs were split according to Table 1 for
analysis of research question seven and its hypotheses. One individual listed their AFSC
as “student” which prevented accurate grouping in any category. In order to maintain
more accurate results this record was not used in hypothesis seven. The distribution
between operational and non-operational is fairly even. Table 2 provides a quick
summary of all results in which hypotheses that were confirmed are bolded. The detailed
data collected from the surveys that was normalized to match the base line survey and
used for all analysis can be found in Appendix C.
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TABLE 1. Job Category of Respondents
Group

Total

Percent of Total

Included AFSCs

Operational
AFSCs

35

46.7%

All 11 Series (Pilot), 12 Series
(Navigator), and 13 Series (Space
and Missile Ops)

Non Operational
AFSCs

40

53.3 %

All other AFSCs including 14, 21,
31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 62, and 63
Series.
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Table 2. Results Summary

H1

Results
z=-5.85; reject Ho

α
.01

H2

z=.688; fail to reject
Ho

H3

Z=.2295; fail to reject
Ho

H4

Z=3.16; reject Ho

H5a

Z=.486; fail to reject
Ho

H5b

Z=-2.014; fail to
reject Ho

.05

H6

Z=1.950; reject Ho

.05

.01

Meaning
Decision Makers are risk averse in Information
Security related Gain Domains
Decision makers are not significantly risk seeking
in information security related loss domains nor are
they significantly risk averse
Decision makers do not exhibit significantly
different behavior between operational outcomes
and security outcomes in an information security
context loss domain
A negatively phrased information security
outcome frame will result in significantly more
risk seeking behavior by decision makers than a
positively framed similar outcome .
After exposure to a negative shift in the reference
point decision makers demonstrate no significant
change in risk behavior in information security loss
domains.
After exposure to a negative shift in the reference
point decision makers are not significantly more
risk averse in gains in an information security
context. In actuality this data indicates decision
makers are significantly more risk seeking after the
shift in reference point!
Decision makers are significantly more likely to
choose operationally favorable outcomes over
security favorable outcomes when presented
with each in an information security related
context.
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TABLE 2 (continued). Results Summary
H7a

Z=-1.92; reject Ho

H7b

Z=.308; fail to reject
Ho

H7c

Z=-1.75; fail to reject
Ho

H7d Z=-1.76; reject Ho

H7e

Z=.925; fail to reject
Ho

.05

.05

Non operational decision makers are
significantly more risk averse in information
security related gain domains than operational
decision makers.
Operational and non operational decision makers
do not significantly differ in information security
loss domain risk behavior.
Operational background decision makers do not
differ significantly from non operational
background decision makers in the weighting of
operations and security outcomes in information
security contexts. In fact non operational decision
makers placed significantly more decision weight
on operational outcomes than operational decision
makers.
Operational decision makers are significantly
more risk averse after exposure to a negative
shift in the reference point in information
security related gain domains than non
operational decision makers.
After exposure to a negative shift in the reference
point, operational and non operational decision
makers do not significantly differ in information
security loss domain risk behavior.
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TABLE 3. Hypothesis 1 Analysis and Results
Research Question 1:
Are decision makers risk averse in gain domains as in the context of information
security?
Hypothesis 1:
Decision Makers are risk averse in gain domains in the information security context.
Corresponding Survey Questions:
1, 5, 8, 11
Statistical Test 1 – Large Sample Test of Hypothesis about a Population Proportion
Lower Tail:
Risk Averse (A) Coded as 0. Risk Seeking (B) Coded as 1.
Ho (indifferent in risk behavior): p = .5
Ha (risk averse thus significantly below .5): p < .5
Null Hypothesis p= 0.5
Level of Significance 0.01
Number of Successes 101
Sample Size 304
Sample Proportion 0.332236842
Standard Error 0.028676967
Z Test Statistic -5.850101214

Lower-Tail Test
Lower Critical Value -2.326347874
p-Value 2.45637E-09
RESULT: Reject the null hypothesis
CONCLUSION:
Research hypothesis confirmed; decision makers are significantly risk averse in general
information security gain domains.

48

TABLE 4. Hypothesis 2 Analysis and Results
Research Question 2:
Are decision makers risk seeking in loss domains in the context of information security?
Hypothesis 2:
Decision Makers are risk seeking in loss domains in the information security context.
Corresponding Survey Questions:
4, 7, 9, 12
Statistical Test 2 – Large Sample Test of Hypothesis about a Population Proportion
Upper Tail:
Risk Averse (A) Coded as 0. Risk Seeking (B) Coded as 1.
Ho (indifferent in risk behavior): p = .5
Ha (risk averse thus significantly below .5): p < .5
Null Hypothesis

p= 0.5

Level of Significance 0.1
Number of Successes 158
Sample Size 304
Sample Proportion 0.519736842
Standard Error 0.028676967
Z Test Statistic 0.688247202

Upper-Tail Test
Upper Critical Value 1.281551566
p-Value 0.245648562
Do not reject the null hypothesis
CONCLUSION:
Research hypothesis not confirmed; decision makers are indifferent in risk behavior in
general information security loss domains.
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TABLE 5. Hypothesis 3 Analysis and Results
Research Question 3:
Do decision makers exhibit differing degrees of risk seeking and risk aversion in
operationally framed domains versus security framed loss domains?
Hypothesis 3:
Decision makers exhibit significantly more risk seeking behavior in operationally framed
loss domains than in security framed loss domains.
Corresponding Survey Questions:
Operational Loss – 4, 7
Security Loss – 9, 12
Statistical Test - Large Sample Test of Hypothesis about p1 – p2
Upper Tail:
Risk Averse (A) Coded as 0. Risk Seeking (B) Coded as 1.
Ho (no difference between ops (p1) and security (p2)): p1 – p2 = 0
Ha (ops (p1) is more risk seeking than security (p2)): p1 – p2 > 0
Hypothesized Difference 0
Level of Significance 0.1
Group 1
Number of Successes 80
Sample Size 152
Group 2
Number of Successes 78
Sample Size 152
Group 1 Proportion 0.526315789
Group 2 Proportion 0.513157895
Difference in Two Proportions 0.013157895
Average Proportion 0.519736842
Z Test Statistic 0.229594678
Upper-Tail Test
Upper Critical Value 1.281551566
p-Value 0.409203372
Do not reject the null hypothesis
CONCLUSION:
Research hypothesis not confirmed; decision makers are no more risk seeking in
operationally framed loss domains than security framed loss domains.
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TABLE 6. Hypothesis 4 Analysis Results
Research Question 4:
Can differences in framing through word connotations in an information security
problem lead to greater risk seeking behavior?
Hypothesis 4:
A negative information security outcome frame will result in greater risk seeking
behavior than a positive information security outcome frame.
Corresponding Survey Questions:
Negative - 2
Positive - 13
Statistical Test - Large Sample Test of Hypothesis about p1 – p2
Upper Tail:
Risk Averse (A) Coded as 0. Risk Seeking (B) Coded as 1.
Ho (no difference between negative (p1) and positive (p2)): p1 – p2 = 0
Ha (negative (p1) is more risk seeking than positive (p1)): p1 – p2 > 0
Hypothesized Difference 0
Level of Significance 0.01
Group 1
Number of Successes 56
Sample Size 76
Group 2
Number of Successes 37
Sample Size 76
Group 1 Proportion 0.736842105
Group 2 Proportion 0.486842105
Difference in Two Proportions 0.25
Average Proportion 0.611842105
Z Test Statistic 3.162335292
Upper-Tail Test
Upper Critical Value 2.326347874
p-Value 0.000782546
Reject the null hypothesis
CONCLUSION:
Research hypothesis confirmed; decision makers are more risk seeking in negatively
framed information security outcomes than the same positively framed outcomes.
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TABLE 7. Hypothesis 5a Analysis and Results
Research Question 5:
Will a shift in the decision making reference point alter the preference for given
prospects?
Hypothesis 5a:
Shifting the reference point into a loss domain will result in significantly more risk
averse behavior to for losses.
Corresponding Survey Questions:
Pre-Treatment Gain – 1, 5, 8, 11
Post-Treatment Gain – 15, 17, 19, 21
Statistical Test - Large Sample Test of Hypothesis about p1 – p2
Upper Tail:
Risk Averse (A) Coded as 0. Risk Seeking (B) Coded as 1.
Ho (no difference between negative (p1) and positive (p2)): p1 – p2 = 0
Ha (after (p2) is more risk averse than before (p1)): p1 – p2 > 0
Hypothesized Difference 0
Level of Significance 0.1
Group 1
Number of Successes 158
Sample Size 304
Group 2
Number of Successes 152
Sample Size 304
Group 1 Proportion 0.519736842
Group 2 Proportion 0.5
Difference in Two Proportions 0.019736842
Average Proportion 0.509868421
Z Test Statistic 0.486759079
Upper-Tail Test
Upper Critical Value 1.281551566
p-Value 0.313214536
Do not reject the null hypothesis
CONCLUSION:
Research hypothesis not confirmed; A shift in the reference point into a loss domain did
not make decision making behavior for losses significantly more risk averse.

52

TABLE 8. Hypothesis 5b Analysis and Results
Research Question 5:
Will a shift in the decision making reference point alter the preference for given
prospects?
Hypothesis 5b:
Shifting the reference point into a loss domain will result in significantly more risk
averse behavior for gains.
Corresponding Survey Questions:
Pre treatment Loss – 4, 7, 9, 12
Post Treatment Loss – 16, 18, 20, 22
Statistical Test - Large Sample Test of Hypothesis about p1 – p2
Upper Tail:
Risk Averse (A) Coded as 0. Risk Seeking (B) Coded as 1.
Ho (no difference between negative (p1) and positive (p2)): p1 – p2 = 0
Ha (after (p2) is more risk averse than before (p1)): p1 – p2 > 0
Hypothesized Difference 0
Level of Significance 0.05
Group 1
Number of Successes 101
Sample Size 304
Group 2
Number of Successes 125
Sample Size 304
Group 1 Proportion 0.332236842
Group 2 Proportion 0.411184211
Difference in Two Proportions -0.078947368
Average Proportion 0.371710526
Z Test Statistic -2.014081917
Upper-Tail Test
Upper Critical Value 1.644853627
p-Value 0.977999533
Do not reject the null hypothesis
CONCLUSION:
Research hypothesis not confirmed; A shift in the reference point into a loss domain did
not make decision making behavior for gains significantly more risk averse.
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TABLE 9. Hypothesis 6 Analysis and Results
Research Question 6 –
Do decision makers place a greater decision weight on operational outcomes or
information security outcomes?
Hypothesis 6 –
When presented with situations involving information security and operations, decision
makers will tend to give a greater decision weight to operations outcomes.
Corresponding Survey Questions:
3, 6, 10, 14
Statistical Test 1 – Large Sample Test of Hypothesis about a Population Proportion
Lower Tail:
Security Outcome (A) Coded as 0. Operations Outcome (B) Coded as 1.
Ho (indifferent in decision weights): p = .5
Ha (operations given greater weight): p > .5
Null Hypothesis p= 0.5
Level of Significance 0.05
Number of Successes 169
Sample Size 304
Sample Proportion 0.555921053
Standard Error 0.028676967
Z Test Statistic 1.950033738
Upper-Tail Test
Upper Critical Value 1.644853627
p-Value 0.025586049
Reject the null hypothesis
CONCLUSION:
Research hypothesis confirmed; When presented with situations involving information
security and operations, decision makers will tend to give a greater decision weight to
operations outcomes.
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TABLE 10. Hypothesis 7a Analysis and Results
Research Question 7:
Does the decision maker’s career background have a significant influence on risk
behavior in decision making?
Hypothesis 7a:
Decision makers with an operational background are more risk seeking in information
security gain domains.
Corresponding Survey Questions:
1, 5, 8, 11
Statistical Test - Large Sample Test of Hypothesis about p1 – p2
Lower Tail:
Risk Averse (A) Coded as 0. Risk Seeking (B) Coded as 1.
Ho (no difference between non ops (p1) and ops (p2)): p1 – p2 = 0
Ha (non ops (p1) is more risk averse than ops (p2)): p1 – p2 < 0
Hypothesized Difference 0
Level of Significance 0.05
Group 1
Number of Successes 45
Sample Size 160
Group 2
Number of Successes 54
Sample Size 140
Group 1 Proportion 0.28125
Group 2 Proportion 0.385714286
Difference in Two Proportions -0.104464286
Average Proportion 0.33
Z Test Statistic -1.919715403
Lower-Tail Test
Lower Critical Value -1.644853627
p-Value 0.027446929
Reject the null hypothesis
CONCLUSION:
Research hypothesis confirmed; Non operational decision makers are significantly more
risk averse in information security gain domains than operational decision makers.
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TABLE 11. Hypothesis 7b Analysis and Results
Research Question 7:
Does the decision maker’s career background have a significant influence on risk
behavior in decision making?
Hypothesis 7b:
Non operational decision makers are significantly more risk averse in information
security related loss domains than operational decision makers.
Corresponding Survey Questions:
4, 7, 9, 12
Statistical Test - Large Sample Test of Hypothesis about p1 – p2
Lower Tail:
Risk Averse (A) Coded as 0. Risk Seeking (B) Coded as 1.
Ho (no difference between non ops (p1) and ops (p2)): p1 – p2 = 0
Ha (non ops (p1) is more risk averse than ops (p2)): p1 – p2 < 0
Hypothesized Difference 0
Level of Significance 0.05
Group 1
Number of Successes 84
Sample Size 160
Group 2
Number of Successes 71
Sample Size 140
Group 1 Proportion 0.525
Group 2 Proportion 0.507142857
Difference in Two Proportions 0.017857143
Average Proportion 0.516666667
Z Test Statistic 0.308778291
Lower-Tail Test
Lower Critical Value -1.644853627
p-Value 0.621254908
Do not reject the null hypothesis
CONCLUSION:
Research hypothesis not confirmed; Non ops decision makers are not significantly more
risk averse in information security loss domains than operational decision makers.
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TABLE 12. Hypothesis 7c Analysis and Results
Research Question 7:
Does the decision maker’s career background have a significant influence on risk
behavior in decision making?
Hypothesis 7c:
Operational decision makers demonstrate greater preference for operational outcomes to
security outcomes in information security contexts than non operational decision makers.
Corresponding Survey Questions:
3, 6, 10, 14
Statistical Test - Large Sample Test of Hypothesis about p1 – p2
Upper Tail:
Security Outcome (A) Coded as 0. Operations Outcome (B) Coded as 1.
Ho (no difference between ops (p1) and non ops (p2)): p1 – p2 = 0
Ha (ops (p1) prefers operations outcomes more than non ops (p2)): p1 – p2 > 0
Hypothesized Difference 0
Level of Significance 0.05
Group 1
Number of Successes 61
Sample Size 140
Group 2
Number of Successes 86
Sample Size 160
Group 1 Proportion 0.435714286
Group 2 Proportion 0.5375
Difference in Two Proportions -0.101785714
Average Proportion 0.49
Z Test Statistic -1.759410107
Upper-Tail Test
Upper Critical Value 1.644853627
p-Value 0.960746062
Do not reject the null hypothesis
CONCLUSION:
Research hypothesis not confirmed; Operational decision makers demonstrate greater
preference for operational outcomes to security outcomes in information security
contexts than non operational decision makers.
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TABLE 13. Hypothesis 7d Analysis and Results
Research Question 7:
Does the decision maker’s career background have a significant influence on risk
behavior in decision making?
Hypothesis 7d:
After a negative shift in the reference point, decision makers with an operational
background are more risk averse than non-operational decision makers, in a gain
domain.
Corresponding Survey Questions:
15, 17, 19, 21
Statistical Test - Large Sample Test of Hypothesis about p1 – p2
Lower Tail:
Risk Averse (A) Coded as 0. Risk Seeking (B) Coded as 1.
Ho (no difference between non ops (p1) and ops (p2)): p1 – p2 = 0
Ha (ops (p1) is more risk averse than non ops (p2)): p1 – p2 < 0
Hypothesized Difference 0
Level of Significance 0.05
Group 1
Number of Successes 49
Sample Size 140
Group 2
Number of Successes 72
Sample Size 160
Group 1 Proportion 0.35
Group 2 Proportion 0.45
Difference in Two Proportions -0.1
Average Proportion 0.403333333
Z Test Statistic -1.761430191
Lower-Tail Test
Lower Critical Value -1.644853627
p-Value 0.039082809
Reject the null hypothesis
CONCLUSION:
Research hypothesis confirmed; After a negative shift in the reference point, operational
decision makers are significantly more risk averse in information security related gain
domains than non operational decision makers.
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TABLE 14. Hypothesis 7e Analysis and Results
Research Question 7:
Does the decision maker’s career background have a significant influence on risk
behavior in decision making?
Hypothesis 7e:
After a negative shift in the reference point, decision makers with an operational
background are more risk averse than non-operational decision makers, in a loss domain.
Corresponding Survey Questions:
16, 18, 20, 22
Statistical Test - Large Sample Test of Hypothesis about p1 – p2
Lower Tail:
Risk Averse (A) Coded as 0. Risk Seeking (B) Coded as 1.
Ho (no difference between ops (p1) and non ops (p2)): p1 – p2 = 0
Ha (ops (p1) is more risk averse than non ops (p2)): p1 – p2 < 0
Hypothesized Difference 0
Level of Significance 0.05
Group 1
Number of Successes 74
Sample Size 140
Group 2
Number of Successes 76
Sample Size 160
Group 1 Proportion 0.475
Group 2 Proportion 0.528571429
Difference in Two Proportions 0.053571429
Average Proportion 0.5
Z Test Statistic 0.9258201
Lower-Tail Test
Lower Critical Value -1.644853627
p-Value 0.82273026
Do not reject the null hypothesis
CONCLUSION:
Research hypothesis not confirmed; After a negative shift in the reference point,
operational decision makers are not significantly more risk averse in information
security related loss domains than non operational decision makers.
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V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Discussion of Results
As evidenced by the results of the previous chapter, the use of Prospect Theory to
model decision making behavior in information security produced mixed results. While
it was clear in H1 that decision makers are significantly risk averse in information
security gain domains, the results for loss domains in H2 showed no significant risk
behavior preference, especially risk seeking as hypothesized. The essence of observed
behavior that drove this research effort seemed to show a tendency for risk seeking
behavior in domains that presented operational losses while increasing security. Clearly
the behavior in this research does not academically confirm this observation.
Additionally, the participants in this study did not demonstrate significant difference in
risk seeking behavior between operational and security contexts as demonstrated by the
results of H3.
H4 provided perhaps one of the clearest possible explanations for any observed
risk seeking behavior in information security decisions. The extremely significant results
showed that using negative outcome frames will lead to risk seeking behavior. This is a
very important finding. It clearly demonstrates that there are circumstances where
decision makers risk behavior can be biased by factors outside their control. While the
results of H2 showed that decision maker perception of loss domains did not significantly
alter decision preference, the negative framing of the outcome did. The next section
discusses some of the weakness of the study that may have contributed to this difference
in behavior. It is clear that decision making intentions can be significantly affected by
the presentation frame of the outcome, when offered negatively. For information security
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professionals and decision makers it is thus very important to understand how options
presented for decisions are framed in an effort to eliminate this framing bias effect from
decision making. While not explicitly stated as a hypothesis, also of note is the fact that
there was no statistical difference between operational and non operational personnel
when investigating H4. This means that the affect of outcome frames transcended career
field background.
Hypothesis 5a and 5b explored how a scenario designed to shift the decision
maker’s reference point would influence decision making intentions. The negative
scenario should have slid the value curve to the left and resulted in even greater risk
aversion in most if behavior conformed exactly as prospect theory predicts. In H5a the
results did not confirm this behavior. It showed that decision makers were no more risk
averse in loss domains than when dealing with a much more positive point of reference.
However this result would be expected in this effort as H2 demonstrated that decision
makers were not risk seeking in loss domains before the new reference point. As such
there would need to be far greater risk aversion after the shift in reference point to
produce significant results.
The results of analysis in H5b showed that decision makers are not more risk
averse in gain domains after a shift in reference. In fact, it showed that decision makers
are actually more risk seeking in gain domains after a negative shift in reference. This is
completely contrary to behavior under risk as predicted by prospect theory. At this point,
there is little information to indicate why this type of behavior would occur. If this
hypothesis were correct it would mean that if a decision maker in practice is exposed to a
large negative shift in information security reference point it is likely that decisions made
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after that for gains will be risk seeking. This could be a result of the decision maker
trying to “get well” by choosing riskier alternatives that offer a chance of greater
improvements in security while carrying greater implementation and operational risks.
However, more research is necessary in this area to fully understand why the observed
phenomenon was such a departure from previously established theory.
H6 offered another interesting significant finding. This hypothesis was an attempt
to determine if a decision maker would place greater weight on operational outcomes or
security outcomes if forced to choose between the two. As mentioned previously this
attempt was an effort to discern how decision weights may be applied as outlined in
prospect theory. The results of the research showed that, in general, decision makers are
significantly more likely to prefer operational outcomes over security outcomes. This
helps to establish the idea that decision makers will tend to place a greater weight on the
operational piece versus the security piece when presented with an information security
related problem. This is not to say that the weight is so great that it will always outweigh
security concerns, but it will impact the final analysis. The fact that operations outweigh
security is perhaps intuitively obvious to many people as any information system likely
exists to serve some operational purpose important to the organization. It is interesting
though that the results were not more significant. This may be because the military
environment forces careful consideration between security and operations in all areas not
just information security, thus impacting the results.
Hypothesis 7a determined that non-operational decision makers are significantly
more risk averse in information security gain domains than operational decision makers.
Of note is the fact that this wording is merely a construction of the hypothesis test. The
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same test worded in the opposite way, which still yields the same significant results just
in the opposite direction is that operational decision makers are significantly more risk
seeking that non-operational decision makers in gain domains. However, this does not
mean that operational decision makers are risk seeking overall in gain domains, they just
happen to exhibit more risk seeking behavior than non-operational personnel. The
overall numbers show that they are still risk averse in this area. Hypothesis 7b showed
that there was no significant difference between the two groups in loss domains, in
contrast to hypothesized behavior.
Hypothesis 7c demonstrated that contrary to the hypothesis, non-operational
background AFSC personnel actually placed significantly more decision weight on
operational outcomes than operational background personnel. There is insufficient data
available in this research effort to explain why this may be the case. The logic behind
this hypothesis may be flawed in that operational personnel may actually take a more
casual approach to operations than envisioned. Another explanation could involve
demand characteristics where operational people tried to be more security conscious
because they knew they were under study and non-operational people tried to be more
operationally conscious for the same reason. Without more investigation the reasons for
this contradiction will not be known.
Hypothesis 7d and 7e dealt with behavior of operational and non-operational
personnel after exposure to a negative shift in reference. As hypothesized in 7d,
operational personnel were more risk averse in information security gain domains after
exposure to the negative scenario than non-operational personnel. However the same
behavior difference was not validated in information security loss domains in 7e. The
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reason for the significance risk aversion in gains versus no difference in loss domains is
not apparent.
The research and hypotheses discussed prevent concluding that prospect theory as
described provides a perfect model for describing decision making under risk in
information security contexts. It does provide general insights that can be used as a
starting point for future research. Decision making is clearly affected by the framing of
the problem. Further we know that decision makers will place more weight on
operational outcomes than security outcomes. Thus the research has shown that
information security decision making is more than just following a prescriptive approach.
If a prescriptive approach leads to a decision, one frame could result in a completely
different decision than another. An individual’s background also clearly influences the
decision making process as there are distinct differences between operational and nonoperational decision makers, even if they do not directly conform to the espoused
hypotheses. This work is an important first step in confirming that there needs to be
more attention placed on investigating decision making behavior to perhaps develop a
comprehensive descriptive model for how decision making is actually occurring in
information security contexts today. From there, prescriptive model development for
approaching information security risks will be much more valuable as they will account
for reality.
Weaknesses and Limitations
While the assumption of a random sample was explained earlier, it is wholly
possible that the sample of majors assigned to AFIT is far from random. There could be
a bias between Air Command and Staff College IDE opportunities and AFIT IDE
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opportunities. Thus there may have been a purposeful non-random placement of
personnel in one program or the other. The sample collected represents an even
distribution of career fields, but this may not be the result of randomization it may simply
be a by-product of assignment to an IDE program based on some criteria. However,
there is nothing that states that there will be a distinction between programs for a specific
reason. As such,, the random selection assumption is maintained.
The study was also limited to a degree by the environment in which it was
conducted. Since the survey was distributed at the end of each class and presented as the
last item of completion before leaving, there is a possibility that adequate thought may
not have been given to each scenario. This seems to have been the case somewhat as
average completion as observed by the researcher was less then 20 minutes in every case
with one individual completing in less than five minutes. This is in contrast to the pilot
study, where the average completion time was 25 minutes.
A key limitation of the current study is that it measured behavioral intentions
rather than actual behavior. Since the participants were students there was no way to
observe them in situations that actually mimicked those that were used to investigate
information security risk decision making bias. Intentions do not necessarily correspond
directly to actual behavior, so there is a possibility that even when a participant answered
in one way they could act the opposite way when faced with a similar scenario in real
life. Just as in developing the target sample, it was not possible to measure actual DAA
behavior in the allotted time frame. Further, there may be problems with research
validity in trying to measure multiple DAAs behavior across widely different contexts.
Due to its complexity, information security decision making under risk does not present
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easy opportunity for developing standardized scenarios in a laboratory environment that
are still realistic and meaningful.
Perhaps the biggest limitation of this effort is the fact that current DAAs were not
actually used to investigate DAA behavior. As mentioned before, the difficulty of
completing this effort with actual DAAs in the allotted timeframe precluded a direct
study. For reasons mentioned above, using a group of likely future DAAs provided a
more expedient and efficient approach to investigate information security decisionmaking behavior. However there is a possibility that this group does not actually reflect
DAA behavior in any way. This is due to the fact that these particular individuals may
never be DAAs. Further these individuals are earlier in their respective careers meaning
there could be any number of effects in the time between this study and the time the
individual is a DAA that would influence and shape their decision making processes.
Even if DAA comparison assumptions were completely valid or real DAAs were used,
the ability to generalize outside the military is very limited. The military is a unique
community with a unique set of operational requirements. This environment itself could
introduce any number of biases that influence decision makers when compared to their
civilian counterparts.
The scenarios themselves may have been a point of potential weakness. While
they were structured along previously validated prospect theory work, they may have not
accurately captured desired types of scenarios. One reason for this is that the exact
wording of the scenarios into an information security decision making context was
entirely subjective and at the discretion of the researcher. While words were carefully
chosen based on experience, advisor feedback, and pilot response it is still possible that
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the wording may not have accurately conveyed the gain and loss domains in an
appropriate manner to accurately reflect the constructs being measured in this study.
There were no prior studies along these lines that provided a baseline, good or bad, to
work from in the development of appropriately worded questions. This weakness could
help explain why H2 results were not significant while H4 results were. These questions
both presented a risk seeking and risk averse alternative, but their wording and scenario
development were entirely different. This disparity should be investigated further. It
could be that decision makers are indeed risk seeking in loss domains, but the questions
or scenario were worded in such a manner that they did not perceive themselves to be in a
loss domain at that time.
The questions in the survey were written in a manner that was general enough that
individuals would be able to imagine themselves in that frame of reference without prior
experience in that area. However, this generality could also have influenced results.
Different participants may have interpreted the meaning of certain words differently than
other participants. As a result they may have been making their information security risk
based decision in different contexts even though every attempt was made to standardize
this context for valid aggregation of results and analysis.
Another area of weakness was that the research was limited in scope and not able
to expose all potential biases or may not have been capable of correctly identifying biases
as it was limited to a choice of one of two artificially constructed scenarios. This
methodology, as outlined in prospect theory, worked well to validate this theory in the
arenas of finance and medicine. It has been witnessed to a much lesser extent in
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information technology such as in the Rose and Rose study. These situations often were
simpler in nature and not necessarily subject to as many influences.
Another limitation with the structuring of questions in the survey was the numbers
chosen for each decision area. They were developed to closely mirror previous prospect
theory work, but the numbers in the scenarios may have been a confounding variable.
Prospect theory outlined that degrees of gain and loss can influence risk decision
behavior. However, in this case it was typically skewed at the ends with gain and loss
numbers either very low or very high modifying resultant behavior. These types of
number situations were avoided in this study. That does not mean that the numbers
chosen did not represent some level of extreme on the high end or low end for gains or
losses in any participant’s opinion. As mentioned, different number combinations were
used in an attempt to strengthen generalizability and validity of the final results.
However, these different number combinations, if perceived as particularly extreme,
could have lead to results that would be inconsistent with situations that are more
common and not as extreme.
Another limitation of the study was that the type of data collected limited more
detailed analysis through regression and other statistical means to determine if there were
other influences into decision making behavior. This does limit the ability to even
determine if bias exists in only particular areas or under specific circumstances. For
example, collecting detailed demographic data could have revealed differing results by
gender, age, or any number of other factors or combination thereof. The research was
structured as it was primarily for the purposes of brevity and parsimoniousness to solely
investigate the question of existence of bias rather than a detailed analysis of factors that
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contribute to bias. Due to the lack of research in this specific subject the effort was
scoped to ensure that the basic question of bias existence be answered before structuring
more detailed studies.
Future Research
In order to truly investigate any potential biases in DAA information security
decision making, the best way ahead may be a case study to directly identify factors by
interviewing DAAs before and after security inspections. This effort would allow DAAs
to explicitly state how they made decisions. Common factors across many DAAs and
many situations could provide the basis for developing a strong model of decision
making in information security. This kind of research would be very beneficial and have
a high degree of validity, but will take a great amount of time and effort.
Other future research could repeat a similar study with detailed demographics and
dispositional characteristics to do factor analysis to determine if there may be influences
directly tied to certain characteristics or demographic traits. As outlined in the literature
review there have been studies identifying personality traits, demographics such as age,
and other areas that have an impact on risk behavior. These may or may not hold true
within the context of information security.
Along the same lines, a survey could be used to identify other potential bias
factors or items that influence decision making within information security. Questions
could be developed to investigate organizational influences such as culture, finances,
mission, and others to determine if there are organizational influences. Also a wide
variety of other influences could be explored such as trust or others may provide valuable
concepts for exploration of information security decisions.
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Similar research could be reaccomplished but with a concerted effort to try
different types of scenarios. As mentioned in the previous section, there could have been
problems with the way the scenarios were worded to reflect gain and loss domains.
There may be better ways to do this. In fact this research demonstrated that there are
influences on information security decision making, but before taking a similar survey to
DAAs more time should be spent developing valid scenarios.
Due to the inclusion and focus only on the military in this research, this approach
or any of the additional areas outlined above could be accomplished in a civilian context
as well. This may help determine if the phenomenon witnessed here are applicable in
every information security related context and if there are any differences. It could very
well be the case that the civilian community is even more susceptible to some of the
behavioral bias discovered in this research.
Conclusion
This research effort was an attempt to look beyond the prescriptive approaches to
managing information security that seem to dominate the literature today. The
community of information security professionals may be well off the mark in further
prescriptive development if they do not stop to take some time to investigate how
decisions are actually being made in the information security arena. As information
security involves numerous decisions in risk management, the risk taking behavior of the
decision maker must be clearly understood. Unfortunately, decision makers often do not
behave in an ideal or prescribed manner. How they handle risk may be consciously
influenced by many circumstances that many organizations face including budget
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pressures, organizational culture, and other factors. Additionally, risk behavior is likely
influenced by a number of factors that the decision maker is not even aware of.
This research was an initial attempt at investigating the subconscious influences
that may prime decision makers to behave in certain ways under risk. As mentioned
before this effort had mixed results, but its greatest contribution may be the fact that it
demonstrated that information security decision makers can be influenced or biased by
factors outside of their control. If this is the case, some future research must be
accomplished to help understand the phenomenon in greater detail. This is essential in
order to develop prescriptive practices taking more into account than just and idealized
approach to how a decision maker should handle information security and the risk that it
entails. Without more effort along these lines information security is likely to see
approaches that may not be feasible in practice. In essence, this jeopardizes further
professionalization of the career field of information security. Professionals in this arena
must understand how their decision makers actually behave and ensure that they use this
knowledge to help make the best information security decisions for their organizations.
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Appendix A. Final Survey
Survey Title: Investigating Field Grade Officer Decision Making.
Participation: Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary. However,
consider that the greater the participation, the more insightful and useful the data will be
for researchers.
Anonymity: We greatly appreciate your participation. All of your responses and
information provided in this survey are confidential. No personal information will be
collected in this survey.
Contact Information: If you have any questions about the survey, please contact Dr.
Michael Grimaila, DSN 785-255-3636 x7399 at michael.grimaila@afit.edu.

Survey Instructions:
In this survey, you will be presented with 22 different scenarios that require a choice of
two separate decisions.
Please read the background information and then carefully read each question before
choosing the answer that most closely reflects the decision you would make.
There are no right or wrong answers, so don’t dwell on any one question—just answer
what first comes to mind.
Please do not discuss your answers with other students--we don’t want your opinions and
responses to influence other participants.

ESTIMATED TIME TO COMPLETE: 20-30 Minutes

What is your AFSC ? : _______________________
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BACKGROUND READING:
Following your time at AFIT you are put in charge of an organization in your career
field. The organization that you are transferred to uses a particular information system
(i.e. a unique software application, a special computer network, a unique hardware setup,
etc.) to accomplish its operations. Without this system operating effectively, the
organization finds it very difficult to carry out its day-to-day mission. As such, one of
your most important
responsibilities is to ensure the continued successful operation of this information system.
Recently, the DoD has issued a policy that all information systems used for operations
must be tested to see if there are any problems with the organizations information
security posture. The review is to be carried out by a security official from a different
organization with a final summary of results presented to you. As specified in DoD
policy, the results of the review should be considered by your organization, but the
ultimate decision of how to respond to the findings is totally in your hands as the
information system owner.

Keeping the above information in mind, please respond to the following questions as if
you faced each in the real world.
Consider the information in each question separately from any other questions as they
are all unique scenarios.
Circle either option A or B for each of the given questions.
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In addition to what you read in the initial background, please read the following
description of current operations in your unit and carefully consider it when answering
questions 1-14.
CURRENT OPERATIONS DESCRIPTION
Based on your experience and feedback from your staff over the last year, you feel the
information system in your unit is operating at a superior level. Furthermore, you feel
that current security on the system is very good and perfectly balanced against operations
of the system.
QUESTIONS
A security official reviews the security of your organization’s information system and
presents several areas of concern. Based on these findings, your knowledge of the
system, and the current operations description above, your organization has two options
available of which you must choose one:
A: Implement several new security measures. Realize a guaranteed increase of 10
percent in the system’s operational capability.
B: Do not implement any new security measures. Face a 3/4 probability that the
system’s operational capability will be increased by 13.5 percent and a 1/4 probability
that no operational capability will be gained.
Your organization expects to have 100 network security incidents (virus outbreaks,
hacker attacks, malicious logic, etc.) this year. This is the annual average your
organization has experienced over the last five years. You are presented with the
following two options that will attempt to bolster network security in your organization
of which you must execute one.
A: Implement security plan A which will completely fail to prevent 66 security incidents
B: Implement security plan B, resulting in a 1/3 probability that your organization will
prevent all security incidents and a 2/3 probability that your organization will have 100
security incidents.
Your information system was inspected recently and found to contain several areas of
concern. This information coupled with the current operations description presented
above has forced you to choose one of the following decisions:
A: Implement security measures that increase the system’s security posture 15 percent
while decreasing its operational effectiveness 15 percent.
B: Do not implement security measures and maintain operational effectiveness while
accepting current level of security as adequate.
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A security official reviews the security of your organization’s information system and
presents several areas of concern. Based on these findings, your knowledge of the
system, and the current operations description above, your organization has two options
available of which you must choose one:
A: Implement several new security measures. Realize a guaranteed decrease of 10
percent in the system’s operational capability.
B: Do not implement any new security measures. Face a 3/4 probability that the
system’s operational capability will be decreased by 13.5 percent and a 1/4 probability
that no operational capability will be lost.

A security official reviews the security of your organization’s information system and
presents several areas of concern. Based on these findings, your knowledge of the
system, and the current operations description above, your organization has two options
available of which you must choose one:
A: Implement several new security measures. Realize a guaranteed increase of 25
percent in the system’s operational capability.
B: Do not implement any new security measures. Face a 1/2 probability that the
system’s operational capability will be increased by 50 percent and a 1/2 probability that
no operational capability will be gained.

Your information system was inspected recently and found to contain several areas of
concern. This information coupled with the current operations description presented
above has forced you to choose one of the following decisions:
A: Implement operational fixes that increase operational effectiveness 15 percent while
decreasing security posture 15 percent.
B: Do not implement operational fixes and operate in a less than optimal manner while
maintaining current security level.

75

A security official reviews the security of your organization’s information system and
presents several areas of concern. Based on these findings, your knowledge of the
system, and the current operations description above, your organization has two options
available of which you must choose one:
A: Implement several new security measures. Realize a guaranteed decrease of 25
percent in the system’s operational capability.
B: Do not implement any new security measures. Face a 1/2 probability that the
system’s operational capability will be decreased by 50 percent and a 1/2 probability that
no operational capability will be lost.

A security official reviews the security of your organization’s information system and
presents several areas of concern. Based on these findings, your knowledge of the
system, and the current operations description above, your organization has two options
available of which you must choose one:
A: Implement several new security measures. Realize a guaranteed 10 percent increase
in the system’s security posture.
B: Do not implement any new security measures. Face a 3/4 probability of a 13.5
percent increase in the system’s security posture and a 1/4 probability of no increase in
security posture.

A security official reviews the security of your organization’s information system and
presents several areas of concern. Based on these findings, your knowledge of the
system, and the current operations description above, your organization has two options
available of which you must choose one:
A: Implement several new security measures. Realize a guaranteed decrease of 10
percent in the system’s security posture.
B: Do not implement any new security measures. Face a 3/4 probability of a 13.5
percent decrease in security posture and a 1/4 probability of no decrease in security
posture.
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Your information system was inspected recently and found to contain several areas of
concern. This information coupled with the current operations description presented
above has forced you to choose one of the following decisions:
A: Implement security measures that increase the system’s security posture 60 percent
while decreasing its operational effectiveness 30 percent.
B: Do not implement security measures and maintain operational effectiveness while
accepting current level of security as adequate.

A security official reviews the security of your organization’s information system and
presents several areas of concern. Based on these findings, your knowledge of the
system, and the current operations description above, your organization has two options
available of which you must choose one:
A: Implement several new security measures. Realize a guaranteed 25 percent increase
in the system’s security posture.
B: Do not implement any new security measures. Face a 1/2 probability of a 50 percent
increase in the system’s security posture and a 1/2 percent probability of no increase in
security posture.

A security official reviews the security of your organization’s information system and
presents several areas of concern. Based on these findings, your knowledge of the
system, and the current operations description above, your organization has two options
available of which you must choose one:
A: Implement several new security measures. Realize a guaranteed decrease of 25
percent in the system’s security posture.
B: Do not implement any new security measures. Face a 1/2 probability of a 50 percent
decrease in the system’s security posture and a 1/2 probability of no decrease in security
posture.
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Your organization expects to have 100 network security incidents (virus outbreaks,
hacker attacks, malicious logic, etc.) this year. This is the annual average you have faced
over the last five years. You are presented with the following two options that will
attempt to bolster network security in your organization of which you must execute one.
A: Implement security plan A which will completely prevent 33 security incidents.
B: Implement security plan B which offers a 1/3 probability that all 100 network security
incidents will be prevented, and a 2/3 probability that no network security incidents will
be prevented.

Your information system was inspected recently and found to contain several areas of
concern. This information coupled with the current operations description presented
above has forced you to choose one of the following decisions:
A: Implement operational fixes that increase operational effectiveness 60 percent while
decreasing security posture 30 percent.
B: Do not implement operational fixes and operate in a less than optimal manner while
maintaining current security level.
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Before continuing please read the following operations description and make your
decisions on questions 15 – 22 carefully considering this new information..
CURRENT OPERATIONS DESCRIPTION
Based on your experience and feedback from your staff over the last year you feel the
information system in your unit is operating at a superior level such that no changes are
necessary. . However, you recently have had a major virus outbreak that affected your
system causing a loss of several hundred man hours of work in your organization.
Additionally, a recent criminal investigation reveals that due to poor security someone
hacked into your network and downloaded personnel files from a mid level manager’s
computer. Further, intelligence indicates that there will be heightened cyber attack
activity for the next year in response to recent United States geopolitical policies.
QUESTIONS
A security official reviews the security of your organization’s information system and
presents several areas of concern. Based on these findings and your knowledge of the
system, including the new operations information presented above, your organization has
two options available of which you must choose one:
A: Implement several new security measures. Realize a guaranteed increase of 10
percent in the system’s operational capability.
B: Do not implement any new security measures. Face a 3/4 probability that the
system’s operational capability will be increased by 13.5 percent and a 1/4 probability
that no operational capability will be gained.

A security official reviews the security of your organization’s information system and
presents several areas of concern. Based on these findings and your knowledge of the
system, including the new operations information presented above, your organization has
two options available of which you must choose one:
A: Implement several new security measures. Realize a guaranteed decrease of 10
percent in the system’s operational capability.
B: Do not implement any new security measures. Face a 3/4 probability that the
system’s operational capability will be decreased by 13.5 percent and a 1/4 probability
that no operational capability will be lost.
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A security official reviews the security of your organization’s information system and
presents several areas of concern. Based on these findings and your knowledge of the
system, including the new operations information presented above, your organization has
two options available of which you must choose one:
A: Implement several new security measures. Realize a guaranteed increase of 25
percent in the system’s operational capability.
B: Do not implement any new security measures. Face a 1/2 probability that the
system’s operational capability will be increased by 50 percent and a 1/2 probability that
no operational capability will be gained.

A security official reviews the security of your organization’s information system and
presents several areas of concern. Based on these findings and your knowledge of the
system, including the new operations information presented above, your organization has
two options available of which you must choose one:
A: Implement several new security measures. Realize a guaranteed decrease of 25
percent in the system’s operational capability.
B: Do not implement any new security measures. Face a 1/2 probability that the
system’s operational capability will be decreased by 50 percent and a 1/2 probability that
no operational capability will be lost.

A security official reviews the security of your organization’s information system and
presents several areas of concern. Based on these findings and your knowledge of the
system, including the new operations information presented above, your organization has
two options available of which you must choose one:
A: Implement several new security measures. Realize a guaranteed 10 percent increase
in the system’s security posture.
B: Do not implement any new security measures. Face a 3/4 probability of a 13.5
percent increase in the system’s security posture and a 1/4 probability of no increase in
security posture.

A security official reviews the security of your organization’s information system and
presents several areas of concern. Based on these findings and your knowledge of the
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system, including the new operations information presented above, your organization has
two options available of which you must choose one:
A: Implement several new security measures. Realize a guaranteed decrease of 10
percent in the system’s security posture.
B: Do not increase the system’s security. Face a 3/4 probability of a 13.5 percent
decrease in the system’s security posture and a 1/4 probability of no decrease in security
posture.

A security official reviews the security of your organization’s information system and
presents several areas of concern. Based on these findings and your knowledge of the
system, including the new operations information presented above, your organization has
two options available of which you must choose one:
A: Implement several new security measures. Realize a guaranteed 25 percent increase
in the system’s security posture.
B: Do not implement any new security measures. Face a 1/2 probability of a 50 percent
increase in the system’s security posture and a 1/2 percent probability of no increase in
security posture.

A security official reviews the security of your organization’s information system and
presents several areas of concern. Based on these findings and your knowledge of the
system, including the new operations information presented above, your organization has
two options available of which you must choose one:
A: Implement several new security measures. Realize a guaranteed decrease of 25
percent in the system’s security posture.
B: Do not implement any new security measures. Face a 1/2 probability of a 50 percent
decrease in the system’s security posture and a 1/2 probability of no decrease in security
posture.
END OF SURVEY
Thank you for your participation in this research effort.

81

Appendix B. Final Survey Radonmization Orders

Translation from Randomization to Master
Master
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

A
8
2
6
7
5
14
4
11
9
3
1
12
13
10
18
15
16
19
22
21
20
17

B
9
2
6
1
12
3
11
7
5
14
4
8
13
10
15
20
21
16
17
18
19
22
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C
7
2
10
5
4
14
8
9
11
3
12
1
13
6
21
16
17
18
19
22
15
20

D
8
13
14
7
5
3
9
1
12
6
11
4
2
10
22
17
18
19
20
21
16
15

E
4
2
3
1
7
14
11
9
5
10
12
8
13
6
22
19
18
17
16
15
20
21

F
11
13
10
7
5
6
9
8
4
3
1
12
2
14
18
19
20
21
16
17
22
15

Start with A or B Randomization
Question
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

A = 0; B = 1
A
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
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B
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0

C
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0

D
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0

E
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

F
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1

Appendix C. Survey Data
n=
Question
1
2
3
4

1
21A
1
0
1
1

2
13S
1
1
1
1

3
13S
1
0
0
1

4
11A
1
1
1
1

5
K11M3F
1
1
0
0

6
13S
1
1
0
0

7
12R
0
0
0
0

8
64P
0
0
0
0

9
w11f3b
1
1
1
1

10
13S
1
0
0
0

11
Pilot
0
0
1
0

12
14n
1
0
1
1

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0

0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0

0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1

1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0

0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
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13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

13S4
0
1
1
1

36p
0
1
0
0

34M
0
1
1
1

11H
0
1
0
0

K11M3L
0
1
0
0

33S
1
0
0
0

11F3H
0
1
1
0

21A
0
1
1
0

32e
0
1
1
1

13s
1
0
0
0

33S
1
1
1
0

33S4
1
1
1
0

21M
0
1
0
1

0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1

0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0

0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1

1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0

0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0

1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0

0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1

0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0

0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1

85

27
13S
0
1
1
0

28
33S
0
1
0
0

29
K11M3A
0
1
1
0

30
31P3
1
1
1
1

31
62E
1
1
1
1

32
12A
1
1
1
0

33
11F3h
1
1
1
1

34
13S
0
1
0
1

35
14N
1
1
1
1

36
33S
0
1
1
0

37
21A3
0
1
1
1

38
14N
0
1
1
1

39
34M3
0
1
1
1

1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1

1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1

0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
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